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Experimental evidence suggests that emotions can both speed-up and slow-down the
internal clock. Speeding up has been observed for to-be-timed emotional stimuli that have
the capacity to sustain attention, whereas slowing down has been observed for to-be-
timed neutral stimuli that are presented in the context of emotional distractors. These
effects have been explained by mechanisms that involve changes in bodily arousal, atten-
tion, or sentience. A review of these mechanisms suggests both merits and difﬁculties
in the explanation of the emotion-timing link. Therefore, a hybrid mechanism involving
stimulus-speciﬁc sentient representations is proposed as a candidate for mediating emo-
tional inﬂuences on time. According to this proposal, emotional events enhance sentient
representations, which in turn support temporal estimates. Emotional stimuli with a larger
share in ones sentience are then perceived as longer than neutral stimuli with a smaller
share.
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INTRODUCTION
Being able to time is essential for a range of tasks including driving
a car, cooking a meal, or having a conversation (Schirmer, 2004;
Buhusi and Meck, 2005). Although we typically learn and com-
plete these tasks with little effort, there are instances in which cars
collide,meals overcook, and conversations desynchronize. Thus, it
seems that, although accurate on average, our sense of time is not
ﬁxed but varies within and across individuals.
Prominent among the factors that inﬂuence our sense of time
are emotions (for reviews see Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Craig,
2009a; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009). Evidence for this comes from a
range of paradigms some of which will be shortly reviewed here.
One paradigm entails the presentation of stimuli for which par-
ticipants subsequently estimate or reproduce the duration. With
a few exceptions (e.g., Noulhiane et al., 2007), to-be-timed emo-
tional stimuli elicit longer estimates and reproduction times than
to-be-timed neutral stimuli (Angrilli et al., 1997; Noulhiane et al.,
2007; Doi and Shinohara, 2009). A second popular paradigm is
called duration bisection. In the training phase of this paradigm,
participants learn to discriminate two anchor durations, one short
and one long. In the test phase, participants perceive probe stimuli
ranging in duration from the short to the long anchor and judge
whether these stimuli are more similar to the short or the long
anchor. Again, with a few exceptions (Gil et al., 2009; Droit-Volet
et al., 2010), emotional test stimuli are judged more similar to the
long anchor thanneutral stimuli (Effron et al., 2006;Gil et al., 2007;
Grommet et al., 2011). Finally, researchers have examined the rela-
tionship between emotion and subjective time using a duration
discrimination paradigm with intermediate emotional or neutral
distractors (Lui et al., 2011). Here participants are presented with
two successive stimuli (i.e., S1/S2) and indicate whether the second
stimulus was shorter or longer than the ﬁrst. Participants are more
likely to judge S2 as shorter when it was preceded by an emotional
as compared to neutral distractor.
Together, this literature conﬁrms the popular perception that
emotions both speed-up and slow-down our sense of time. More-
over, it suggests that emotional events are generally perceived as
longer than they really are, which may be conceptualized as a
speedingupof subjective temporal pulses. It also suggests that neu-
tral events occurring in the context of a distracting, emotional one
are perceived as shorter then they really are, which may be concep-
tualized as a slowing down of subjective temporal pulses. Different
mechanisms have been proposed to explain these effects and the
remainder of this paper will focus on reviewing and contrasting
them.
AROUSAL MODULATES TIME
The ﬁrst mechanism draws on a popular timing model derived
from scalar expectancy theory (SET; Gibbon et al., 1984). This
model entails a clock stage comprising a pacemaker and an accu-
mulator, both of which are connected by a switch. The pacemaker
emits pulses that are collected by the accumulator when the switch
is in a closed state. Delayed closing or ﬂickering of the switch
causes pulses to be lost (Penney, 2003). The clock stage is followed
by a memory stage. During this stage, pulses from the accumu-
lator enter working memory and are compared with previously
stored durations. The result of this comparison informs temporal
decisions and associated behavioral responses.
Research in both non-human animals and humans suggests
that bodily arousal affects timing at the clock stage. For exam-
ple, rats injected with the psychostimulant methamphetamine, a
drug which enhances dopaminergic activity, treat a given dura-
tion as longer than do rats injected with saline (Meck, 1983).
In contrast, rats injected with the dopamine antagonist haloperi-
dol treat the duration as shorter than do the control rats (Meck,
1983). In humans, changes in physiological arousal as assessed by
self-report and psychophysiological markers have been shown to
concur with changes in perceived time. Relative overestimations
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have been found in conjunction with a putative increase in bod-
ily arousal (Angrilli et al., 1997; Droit-Volet et al., 2011; Mella
et al., 2011), whereas relative underestimations have been found
with a putative decrease in bodily arousal (Wearden et al., 1999).
As these effects typically represent a simple shift in the timing
function, researchers assume that arousal positively correlates with
pacemaker rate. Moreover, because emotions frequently increase
physiological arousal, emotion effects on timing have been pro-
posed to be mediated by the arousal/pacemaker link (Droit-Volet
and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009).
Although compelling, this proposal is not without problems.
First, the concept of arousal and its relationship to an internal
clock are poorly deﬁned. Implicit in the published work is the
understanding that arousal equates with sympathetic activation
as determined by increased heart-rate, breathing, or skin con-
ductance (e.g., Droit-Volet et al., 2011). However, this and other
possible conceptualizations are not clearly spelled out. Moreover,
it is assumed that this arousal somehow feeds back to the inter-
nal clock supported by the dopaminergic system. Yet, how this
feedback occurs is still unclear. Second, available evidence for a
relationship between emotional arousal and duration estimates is
at best indirect. Although studies have shown corresponding dif-
ferences in arousal measures and duration judgments elicited by
emotional versus neutral stimuli, they never actually correlated
the two at an individual or trial level. Moreover, even if such a
correlation were found, effects of arousal on attention and work-
ing memory (Brennan and Arnsten, 2008; Advokat, 2010) offer
an alternative causal link. Third, there appears to be a mismatch
between the time-course of emotion-induced arousal and timing
effects reported in the literature. The latter have been observed pri-
marily for short stimuli (∼2–3 s) and seem to dissipate for longer
stimuli (Noulhiane et al., 2007; Mella et al., 2011). In comparison,
emotion-induced increases in physiological arousal are relatively
sluggish with heart-rate and skin conductance taking between 3
and 6 s to peak (Bradley et al., 2001; Schirmer and Escofﬁer, 2010).
Moreover, heart-rate for example typically decreases for the ﬁrst
3 s through parasympathetic activation (Bradley et al., 2001). Dur-
ing this time, one should observe a slow-down in time keeping if
heart-rate or sympathetic activation translate into pacemaker rate.
Finally, the arousal model fails to fully accommodate existing data
(Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009). Not all
emotions lead to an increase in physiological parameters linked to
arousal (e.g., sadness; Levenson et al., 1990) but may nevertheless
elicit temporal overestimation (Lee et al., 2011). Furthermore, sit-
uations in which the timing stimulus is neutral, but presented in
the context of an emotionally arousing distractor, fail to produce
temporal overestimations (Lui et al., 2011). Given these problems,
the arousal/pacemaker link may not or may not fully explain the
relationship between emotions and time.
ATTENTION MODULATES TIME
A second putative mechanism by which emotions may shape our
experience of time is linked to the cognitive resources allocated to
stimulus processing. Two possibilities of how stimulus processing
may affect timing will be discussed here. The ﬁrst concerns the
amount of attention individuals dedicate to time. In reference to
the SET timing model, mentioned above, it assumes that the clock
stage (Macar et al., 1994; Droit-Volet, 2003) and/or memory stage
(Buhusi and Meck, 2009) share attentional resources with other
ongoing mental processes such that greater resource allocation to
the temporal dimension of a stimulus results in fewer temporal
pulses being lost. Support for this notion comes from studies that
manipulated participant attention to time. For example, Macar
et al. (1994) presented participants with stimuli for which they
had to subsequently judge both duration and intensity. On some
trials, participants were cued to focus all or most of their attention
on the duration task, whereas on other trials, they were cued to
focus all ormost of their attention on the intensity task. Compared
to the former, the latter trials were more likely to result in tem-
poral underestimations of the target suggesting that pulses from a
putative pacemaker were lost.
In line with this, some researchers reported underestimation of
emotional relative to neutral stimuli in timing tasks. For example,
participants underestimated the duration of appetizing and dis-
gusting food pictures relative to neutral food pictures and this was
interpreted to reﬂect a diversion of attention from the temporal
dimension of the pictures to their emotional dimension (Gil et al.,
2009). As such, the ﬁrst attentional mechanism introduced here
has some explanatory power. Moreover, unlike the arousal mecha-
nism, it makes clear statements as to the underlying processes and
has the advantage that temporal distortions can be explained by
processes occurring during rather than after temporal encoding.
Yet, its problem is that it discords with the overwhelming number
of studies that ﬁnd overestimation for emotional as compared to
neutral stimuli. Given the greater signiﬁcance of emotional rela-
tive to neutral events, the former should always, not just in the case
of disgust, divert attention away from time and produce temporal
underestimations.
A secondvariant of the cognitive resourcemechanismaddresses
this problem. It assumes that it is the stimulus processing itself
that contributes to timing and that attentional resources directed
toward or away from the stimulus determine timing accuracy
(Hicks et al., 1977; Ornstein, 1997). This proposal ﬁts most over-
andunderestimation effects reported in the literature.Overestima-
tions of emotional relative to neutral stimuli could be explained
by the former recruiting more cognitive resources and having
greater ability to sustain attention than the latter. Underestima-
tions of neutral stimuli presented in an emotional as compared
to neutral context could be explained by the former being more
distracting than the latter, thereby leaving fewer resources for the
processing of the timing stimulus (Lui et al., 2011). Neverthe-
less, this proposal is not without problems. For example, it cannot
explain why presentation durations of appetizing foods are under-
estimated relative to neutral foods (Gil et al., 2009) and, more
importantly, it conﬂicts with the evidence that attention to non-
temporal stimulus dimensions typically impairs timing (Macar
et al., 1994).
SENTIENT PROCESSING MODULATES TIME
A third proposal for how emotions inﬂuence time evokes the
concept of sentience – often equated with being aware or con-
scious of one’s self (Craig, 2009a; Wittmann, 2009). Speciﬁcally,
it holds that external and internal sensory signals including infor-
mation from the muscles, skeletal system, and internal organs are
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integrated in the brain and enable self-awareness. As we expe-
rience ourselves across moments or time, the proposal makes
sentience the basis for temporal perception and the mediator in
the relationship between emotions and time. Emotion-induced
bodily changes, such as heart-rate decelerations or accelerations,
presumably increase sentience and thereby sensitivity to the pas-
sage of time. Different lines of theoretical and experimental work
substantiate this possibility.
Vierordt, a nineteenth century pioneer of timing research,
raised the “self” as a potential origin for the emergence of time
(Vierordt, 1868). Furthermore, James (1981) argued for a reliance
of temporal perception on sensation and noted that perceived
durations tend to have an “emotional feeling.” He also famously
speculated about a critical role of bodily feedback for emotion.
Although heavily criticized at the time, recent emotion theory
has turned back to James and leveraged on his ideas. Important
with respect to the present paper is Damasio’s somatic marker
hypothesis, which holds that an emotional event triggers bodily
changes whose feedback to the brain critically contributes, not
just to the emotional experience, but also to the processing of
the event and event-related decision making (Damasio, 1996). In
extension of this, some researchers interested in the processing
of time now hold that there is a relationship between sentient
processing and subjective time (Effron et al., 2006; Craig, 2009a;
Wittmann, 2009).
Experimental support for this assertion is steadily accumulat-
ing. For example, researchers have identiﬁed a correlation between
self-awareness and temporal estimates. Individuals who are exper-
imentally deprived of visual, tactile, and/or auditory stimulation
and whose primary sensory experiences therefore come from
within report that the hours pass more slowly than usual (Schul-
man et al., 1967). Furthermore, it was demonstrated that both
bodily change and awareness of one’s current bodily state positively
predict temporal estimates in interval-timing tasks (Meissner and
Wittmann, 2011). Individuals with a more pronounced decrease
in heart-rate during temporal encoding and a better accuracy at
guessing their own heart-rate were less likely to underestimate a
given temporal duration.
Neuroimaging studies further substantiate the link between
sentient processing and time. Sentient processing has been asso-
ciated with the insular cortex. This structure receives input from
all senses including the somatosensory sense, which apart from
its role in touch informs about visceral, skeletal, and muscular
states. The insula has therefore been proposed as the seat for self-
awareness or consciousness (Craig, 2009a,b). Although, temporal
processing has been largely linked to striatal and prefrontal struc-
tures (Buhusi and Meck, 2005), the insula has been implicated as
well (Pouthas et al., 2005; Livesey et al., 2007; Wittmann et al.,
2010; for a review see Wittmann, 2009). For example, Pouthas
et al. (2005) isolated insula activation both when comparing a
timing task with a control task and when comparing the timing of
long with short durations. Wittmann et al. (2010) further tested
the relationship between insular activation and time. They found
that this activation increased linearly with the encoded stimulus
duration. Based on this and the intricate connections between
insula and striatum (Chikama et al., 1997), one may venture that
the insula’s sentient computations support temporal perception
and potentially mediate the relationship between emotions and
time.
One such possible mediation could entail an inﬂuence
of emotion-induced bodily changes on sentient processing.
Speciﬁcally, such changes might heighten sentient processing and
self-awareness thereby contributing to an increased sensitivity to
the passage of time (Wittmann, 2009). Evidence in support of
this possibility is currently only indirect but nevertheless promis-
ing. First, researchers have shown that both bodily change and
sentience positively predict the duration of temporal estimates.
But more importantly, there seems to be a correlation between
both predictors. Individuals with a greater reduction in heart-
rate during timing trials tended to be better at guessing their
own heart-rate prior to the timing task (Meissner and Wittmann,
personal communication). A second line of support, for a link
between bodily changes and sentient processing comes from the
emotion literature. As demonstrated repeatedly, emotional stimuli
elicit greater bodily changes than neutral stimuli (Bradley et al.,
2001) such that bodily changes may well account for associated
differences in the perception of time. Furthermore, meta-analyses
ﬁnd the insula more strongly activated for emotional as compared
to neutral events, particularly when individuals focus on how they
feel (Phan et al., 2004; Lee and Siegle, 2009). Thus, one may infer
that emotion-induced bodily changes enhance sentient represen-
tations in the insula and that these representations are further
enhanced if bodily changes become the focus of attention. Lastly,
a study by Effron et al. (2006) speaks to the relationship between
bodily states, sentience, and time. These authors asked partici-
pants to perform a temporal bisection task with emotional and
neutral facial expressions in the test phase. In one condition, par-
ticipants were prevented from automatically embodying the facial
expression by holding a pen in their mouth. In another condition,
participants could move their face freely. Relative overestimations
for emotional as compared to neutral expressions were only found
in the latter condition suggesting that bodily representations are
critical for emotion effects on time.
Like the attentional proposal, the sentient proposal has a few
advantages over the arousal proposal. First, it outlines a concrete
mechanism and brain substrate bywhich emotions inﬂuence time.
As such, the proposal can be tested relatively easily. Second, it
ties emotion-induced temporal distortions to processes that occur
while, not after, participants encode time. Speciﬁcally, while the
arousal proposal evokes sympathetic activations that often peak
after the timing stimulus has lapsed, the sentient proposal allows
for any bodily changes to affect time. Hence, also parasympathetic
changes, such as heart-rate decelerations that occur after the onset
of a timing stimulus, can affect temporal estimates. Neverthe-
less, the sentient proposal is not without problems. Speciﬁcally,
if one assumes that emotional stimuli lead to bodily changes and
thus potentially heighten sentient processing and temporal aware-
ness, such stimuli should consistently produce longer temporal
estimates than neutral stimuli. However, emotional events may
both speed-up and slow-down subjective time relative to neutral
events and thus, by itself, this proposal also fails as an adequate
explanation.
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MODEL INTEGRATION
As usual, where there is conﬂict, reconciliation may be attempted
through a compromise of existing proposals. Such a compromise
could take different forms. One possibility is that the various
mechanisms identiﬁed here all support the relationship between
emotions and time and that their respective contributions vary
across situations and,perhaps, individuals. For example, their con-
tributions may depend on the particular emotion that is evoked
by a timing stimulus or distractor. Fear relevant stimuli might
accelerate an internal clock by increasing bodily arousal, captur-
ing an individual’s attention (Pourtois et al., 2006), and enhancing
sentient processing. Disgust relevant stimuli, on the other hand,
may decelerate an internal clock by biasing our attention away
from both the stimulus and its temporal dimension (Curtis et al.,
2004) in-spite of up-regulating sentient processing (Wicker et al.,
2003). Likewise different mechanisms may be at play depending
on whether emotional stimuli are the context or focus of the tim-
ing task and depending on stimulus duration. With respect to the
latter factor, one could envision emotion effects on attention to
be more acute during initial as compared to continued stimulus
processing thus leading to a drop-off of emotion effects for the
timing of longer stimuli.
Despite its ability to accommodate the data, the possibility
of situation-speciﬁc timing mechanisms is unsatisfying. It seems
too ﬂexible to have true explanatory power and thus one may
attempt to reconcile the literature by proposing a fourth, hybrid
mechanism with a more general utility. In light of the preceding
discussion it seems that the stimulus and the sentient processing
mechanisms are well suited for this. Speciﬁcally, all one needs to do
is accept the idea that sentient processing is stimulus-speciﬁc; that
we experience ourselves not independently from our environment
but in relationship to the various stimuli and events we encounter.
Thus,we create stimulus-speciﬁc sentient and ultimately temporal
representations.
Although speculative, this notion is not too far fetched because
there is already evidence that we can assign different temporal
values to equally long and temporarily overlapping stimuli (Pen-
ney et al., 2000). Speciﬁcally, two concurrent stimuli of equivalent
duration, but differing inmodalitymay be perceived as of different
duration, thereby raising the possibility of different (i.e., stimulus-
speciﬁc) sentient representations. In the context of emotions, such
representations could account for both relative over andunderesti-
mations observed in interval-timing studies. As mentioned before,
overestimationswould result for emotional as compared to neutral
timing stimuli due to an increase in sentient processing. Underes-
timations would result for neutral timing stimuli presented in the
context of emotional as compared to neutral distractors.Here, sen-
tient representations emerging from the timing stimulus would be
relatively weaker than the sentient representations emerging from
the emotional distractor, making the former seem shorter than it
really is.
The hybrid model proposed here (Figure 1) fairs better than
the arousal, attention, or sentient model alone in accommodat-
ing the existing data. Moreover, by making emotions relevant for
timing it solves the issue that attention to non-temporal neutral
information (e.g., intensity) impairs timing, whereas attention
FIGURE 1 | Illustrated is a potential mechanism by which emotions
may influence the perceived duration of external events. Depending on
their emotional signiﬁcance, environmental stimuli may trigger bodily
changes, which in turn may increase self-awareness or sentience – a
potential contributor to the perception of time. Depending on their
contribution to bodily and sentient changes, concurrent environmental
stimuli may be perceived as relatively longer (e.g., snake) or shorter (e.g.,
shrub) than their objective duration.
to non-temporal emotional information does not. It holds that
attending to emotions is similar to attending to time. Neverthe-
less, the model is at present highly speculative. It rests on a few
assumptions that have not yet been tested or for which exist-
ing evidence is still equivocal. For example, the assumption that
emotion-induced bodily changes enhance self-awareness awaits
investigation. This could be done by relating objective physio-
logical measures to self-reports of cardiac or respiratory activity
and to temporal judgments. Speciﬁcally, one could test whether
self-reports mediate the relationship between bodily change and
subjective time. Furthermore, the idea of stimulus-speciﬁc sen-
tient representations needs further investigation. The evidence
cited above merely suggests that we can perceive concurrently pre-
sented same-duration stimuli as differently long. Whether and in
what way this is linked to different sentient representations and
whether emotions could differently moderate those are still open
issues.
CONCLUSION
Emotion-induced subjective changes in time are a ubiquitous
everyday phenomenon that is well documented in the literature.
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Different proposals have been put forth to explain how emo-
tions impact time. Of these proposals, a hybrid that combines
sentient and stimulus processing seems tobest accommodate exist-
ing experimental data as it can account for why we sometimes
experience events to last longer and shorter than they really are.
According to this proposal, such events trigger bodily changes that
increase our sense of “being” across time. The subjective duration
of objects that concur with such events then depends on how
much they share in sentience or awareness. Salient objects that
capture and hold attention would be overestimated relative to
other, less salient objects. Thus, differences in perceptual salience
would translate into differences in mnemonic salience as the more
important stimuli would receive greater temporal weights. As
such these objects may more readily inﬂuence present and future
behaviors.
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